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ABSTRACT

The prevention of ethnic conflict has been examined and debated upon within the
Political Science community; studies involving economic standing, government structure, and
historical background have been credited with reducing or preventing ethnic conflict. In the years
leading up to the demise of the Soviet Union ethnic conflict was felt heavily throughout the
Socialist Republics. After the fall of the U.S.S.R. scholars were certain that ethnic conflict would
arise in Kazakhstan but alas it did not, while other post-Soviet states, such as Moldova and
Russia, had experienced ethnic conflict. What prevents ethnic conflict from occurring in one
state but not the other? This thesis proposes that state efforts to promote cultural tolerance reduce
the likelihood of ethnic conflict occurrence. State efforts to promote cultural tolerance include:
language recognition, parliamentary reserved seats, constitutional protection, and inclusive
citizenship laws. This theory is tested via a large-N regression time series cross sectional model
including all of the former Soviet states, examining state-minority group dyads. Relevant factors
such as oil, and group level economic inequality are also controlled for. The results reveal that
inclusive citizenship laws have a positive significant effect on ethnic conflict, while language
recognition seems to have a negative significant effect on ethnic conflict.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Many scholars such as Posen (1993), Lake and Rothchild (1996), Sambanis (2001),
Reynal-Querol (2002), Wolff (2006), and Forsberg (2008) have examined why ethnic conflict
occurs, and how it can be prevented. In the years leading to the demise of the Soviet Union
ethnic riots erupted heavily throughout the Socialist Republics, and Kazakhstan was not exempt
from this (Hajda, 1993). In 1986 ethnic riots broke out in Almaty, Kazakhstan as a reaction to the
newly appointed ethnic Russian First Secretary Gennady Kolbin. Ethnic unrest was prevalent
throughout the Soviet Union: Almaty, Osh, Dushanbe, Sukhumi, Baku, and Kirovabad are some
examples of where ethnic riots occurred. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, given the
1986 ethnic riots and Kazakhstan’s multiethnic population, scholars were certain that ethnic
conflict would arise there (Schatz, 2000). Contrary to popular belief, however, Kazakhstan did
not experience ethnic conflict, while other post-Soviet countries, such as Moldova, Russia,
Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia experienced ethnic conflict. In fact the Soviet era ethnic
riots blossomed into civil wars in the cities of Dushanbe, Sukhumi, Sumgait, and Kirovabad, but
not in Almaty, which had similar Soviet era ethnic riots. What prevents ethnic conflict from
occurring in one state but not another? Studies involving economic standing (Forsberg, 2006),
government type (Reynal-Querol, 2002) (Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2000), historical background
(Geertz, 1973), etc. provide some explanation for why ethnic conflict does not develop.
However, two factors seem to be overlooked: people’s tolerance towards other ethnic groups,
and the role the state can play to positively influence people’s tolerance towards other ethnic
groups. Perhaps, it is the cultural tolerance strategies implemented at the institutional level, such
1

as the Assembly of Peoples, that have kept ethnic conflict at bay in Kazakhstan. Can states
prevent ethnic conflict through the promotion of cultural tolerance? In this thesis I intend to draw
conclusions on the relationship between ethnic conflicts and the efforts of a state to promote
cultural tolerance.
Ethnic conflict is defined as any incident of maintained violent conflict where ethnic,
national, religious, or alternative communal minorities push for changes in status through
challenging the government (Bates et. al, 2003). This study focuses on a subset of this by
examining state-minority group dyads. The default environment for this analysis is in a majority
ethnic dominant country meaning although these states are multiethnic there is still one
predominant ethnic group. The assumption here is that this setting naturally creates risk or
tension for the minority group, so what can the state do to alleviate this? This study argues the
state could implement policies of cultural tolerance systematically at the institutional level.
Cultural tolerance theory is a viable solution in preventing ethnic conflict because it targets the
core of the problem by teaching and promoting tolerance of all ethnic identities through state
actions. Cultural tolerance is defined as the attitude or perception of one individual towards the
social norms, and cultural customs of another culture that is considered foreign to them (Gasser
& Tan, 1999). For the purpose of this research however cultural tolerance is explicitly ethnic,
meaning a culture that stems from an ethnic background and not any other category such as “pop
culture.” I extend this definition further by honing in on state efforts to endorse cultural
tolerance. I argue that a state is more likely to face ethnic conflicts when state efforts to promote
cultural tolerance and cohesiveness are poor or non-existent. State efforts to promote cultural
tolerance include: insuring each ethnic group has a voice within the government through
2

parliamentary reserved seats or other political representation, granting all minorities equal rights
and protection under the constitution, language recognition, and uncomplicated citizenship
obtainment.
The "cultural tolerance" theory proposed and its effect on ethnic conflict is tested via a
large N regression. To measure ethnic conflict occurrence the Uppsala (UCDP) and ACD2EPR
databases are utilized for state conflict, in other words the dependent variable is measured
through state- minority dyads. One exception is noted here: the Kyrgyz-Uzbek conflict, where
state involvement is still uncertain. To measure cultural tolerance a 4 variable scale is presented,
and originally coded. As for case selection data was collected from all of the 15 former Soviet
republics. The AMAR (Minorities at Risk) dataset was used for the selection of various ethnic
groups within each country, which came to 55 ethnic groups total. With 55 ethnic groups
employed in the dataset paired with each individual state, it provides a substantial amount of
dyads to test, 104. The results are then discussed via case studies that illustrate the theoretical
implications generated from them. The purpose of this research is to further investigate the
phenomena of variation in ethnic conflict within the former Soviet Union after its denouement.
Better understanding the methods that prevent ethnic conflict can facilitate states with better
peace efforts. If the relationship between state efforts to promote cultural tolerance and incidents
of ethnic conflict holds true, then perhaps building up the state’s institutional policies and strictly
implementing strategies of tolerance can be included in peace efforts/conflict prevention. First I
discuss the literature as preventions of ethnic conflict, and cultural tolerance as a preventative
strategy. Then, I present the theoretical elements behind cultural tolerance and how states can
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promote cultural tolerance. Furthermore, I explain the quantitative measures and methods details,
followed by the actual regression results. Subsequently, the results are then elucidated by case
studies. Finally, I conclude this analysis with possible implications and setbacks of my research.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
Prevention of Ethnic Conflict
Through identifying which techniques work best for ethnic conflict prevention and
resolution, governments throughout the world can implement these strategies to combat ethnic
conflict altogether. Ethnic identity is frequently considered to be a deep-seeded element in
human kind. Something that has identified us based on appearance and ancient history, where
our history defines us as belonging to a group of people who are genetically similar to us.
Primordialism argues a similar perspective regarding ethnic conflict, theorizing that causes of
ethnic conflict date back to ancient times, therefore past violent incidents and deep-rooted
animosity causes conflict currently (Geertz, 1973). In compliance with this theory, countries that
have weaker kinship ties or a history not rich in past violent incidents should experience less
ethnic conflict than others. Prevention of ethnic conflict is difficult because attachment to one’s
culture or ethnicity can be interpreted to comprise a “primordial” or more “natural” human
connection; one that is stronger than other relationships such as belonging to an overarching
government (Geertz, 1973). Cultural tolerance theory however proposes the promotion of
tolerating these “primordial” connections to ones culture, and learning to co-exist because
cultural elements cannot simply be taken away from people.
Indeed, ethnic identity is made up of intrinsic factors such as history, religion, and
language; henceforth it is more often than not a driving force behind conflict as exemplified in
the Transnistrian war (Ellingsen, 2000). According to Huntington (1993), when people define
themselves by their ethnicity or identity, they will begin to feel an “us” versus “them”
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relationship between themselves and of course the remainder of the population that is not of the
same origin. In this regard diversity has been linked to ethnic conflict occurrence whether
negatively or positively. Collier and Hoeffler (2000) found that ethnic polarization leads to a
greater chance of ethnic conflict, because when a society is ethnically imbalanced it presents the
majority group with an opportunity to impose upon the minority group and in turn conflict
commences; therefore more diversity would be the preventative strategy. In contrast, Sambanis
(2001) argued that ethnic heterogeneity positively correlates with ethnic conflict, thus countries
with higher ethnic polarization should experience more conflict. Given these theories, it is
difficult to conclude whether more ethnic heterogeneity or homogeneity would prevent ethnic
conflict from occurring, because ethnic conflict has taken place in both highly diverse and more
homogenous states. Notwithstanding, the amount of diversity within a given country is not an
element that should be controlled; attempting to do so would be ethically unmoral. These
theories overlook the role of the state, however, in being a preventative factor (Cederman et al,
2010). Governments can play a key role in ethnic conflict prevention by promoting agreements
in order to resolve ethnic conflicts or keep them from reoccurring (Fischer, 2000). Ostwald posits
that public policy can be used to frame identity in such a way that it actually removes the
animosity in ethnic divergence (2015). Framing identity can be taken one step further by framing
tolerance of other identities through the promotion of tolerance of all ethnic groups at the state
level, which is cultural tolerance theory. This allows ethnic groups with the opportunity to
cohabitate without the need of assimilation, again the end goal here is coexistence.
Certainly concepts that make people feel “secure” such as having resources, or land have
been analyzed to correlate with ethnic conflict. The ethnic security dilemma theory highlights
6

fear as a factor that drives ethnic groups into conflict due to collective vulnerabilities as well as
territorial disputes; ethnic groups want to raise their sense of security (Posen, 1993). Lake and
Rothchild (1996) identified ethnic conflict as stemming from resource competition, information
failures, problems of credible commitment, as well as strategic interactions between ethnic
groups. Ethnic identity becomes pivotal when individuals compete for resources therefore
resource competition exacerbates ethnic conflict, so providing equal resources or insuring equal
resources for all ethnic groups would work as a preventative strategy (Ellingsen, 2000). In the
post-Soviet states however, some ethnic groups that had fairly good economic standings in
comparison with the majority group, such as the Uzbek population in Kyrgyzstan or the Slavic
population in Moldova were still a part of ethnic conflict after 1991, therefore equal resources
may not always be enough for prevention.
Specific institutional and ideological movements throughout the globe have also aroused
ethnic conflict, and the new norms of equality have left ethnic groups to challenge the status quo,
leaving ethnic subordination a thing of the past (Horowitz, 1985). In this case states that
experience less inequality should have less ethnic conflict. Horowitz (1993) presented two types
of ethnic conflict prevention: structural techniques and preferential policies. The structural
techniques include innovations in federalism or government structure, regional autonomy, and
electoral systems. Preferential policies consist of public and private sector opportunities such as
business, education, and employment. Policies to manage or settle ethnic conflicts, territorial
organization, containment, institutional frameworks to accommodate each party involved in the
conflict, and intervention from the international community have all been formerly used (Wolff,
2006). Political freedom has been deemed extremely effective as a means to neutralize the
7

hazard of ethnic conflict outbreak, even when managing polarized states (Elbadawi & Sambanis,
2000). Correspondingly on the basis of ethnic conflict prevention, high levels of political
representation amongst the populations of both religiously polarized and ethnically diverse states
have been found to reduce the amount of ethnic conflict (Reynal-Querol, 2002). Political
representation has been also tested to reduce ethnic conflict in new democracies such as in postSoviet Eastern Europe (Alonso & Rufino, 2007). This study accounts for political representation
as a variable in cultural tolerance measurement; minority reserved parliament seats. Ethnic
networks theory proposes ethnic conflict to be the result of mobilization. Even state leaders can
cause ethnic conflicts by placing emphasis on religious, racial, or linguistic divisions (Sambanis
2001). The Chechen and Russian ethnic conflict best illuminates this theory, where on both sides
political leaders exacerbated ethnic divisions, utilizing negative ethnic propaganda. In Russia the
Chechens were depicted as “bandits” and “terrorists” (Russell, 2002). In Chechnya ethnicity was
used as a catalyst to start an uprising for full sovereignty (Russell, 2005). It is imperative to note
here that similar to the way state leaders can cause ethnic conflicts through mobilization, they
also have the capability to prevent ethnic conflict through the same methods. Central to cultural
tolerance theory are state efforts placing emphasis on equal or proportional representation and
unity- by utilizing divisions in a positive way in turn promoting tolerance, out of the former
Soviet states this is best illustrated through Kazakhstan’s Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan,
which works hard in emphasizing unity amongst all ethnic groups. Yet, no one has examined the
promotion of cultural tolerance as a means to combat ethnic conflict, therefore, the next section
reviews literature that may support this hypothesis.
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Cultural Tolerance as a Preventative Strategy
Cultural tolerance studies have examined the effects of tolerance on feelings of aggression,
intergroup contact, and citizen regime type. Few studies evaluate cultural tolerance’s impact on
ethnic conflict especially from a state-level analysis therefore the existing literature is limited. I
intend to fill this gap by analyzing the effect of cultural tolerance on ethnic conflict from a statelevel analysis. There is a need to explore this because there are already unexplained cases of
variance in ethnic conflict such as in the former Soviet Union region- where ethnic riots
flourished into civil wars in cities such as Dushanbe, Sukhumi, Sumgait, and Kirovabad, but did
not produce conflict in Almaty. Although there are no specific studies of the effect of cultural
programming on preventing ethnic conflict, initial studies of cultural programming suggest that
they do change individual behaviors and that they are linked to lower rates of conflict. Cultural
tolerance is a key component to ensure stability and peace within any state. Cultural tolerance is
defined as the attitude or perception of one individual towards the social norms, and cultural
customs of another culture that is considered foreign to them (Gasser & Tan, 1999). In this study,
however, cultural tolerance is focused explicitly on ethnic background and not on any other
category of culture such as “pop culture” for example.
To begin with, presenting the effects of implementing cultural tolerance can be taken from
that of an individual scale and applied to a state global scale. For instance a study conducted by
McAllister et al. (2000), found that the distribution of flyers promoting tolerance and moral
engagement in a high school reduced the amount of physical and verbal aggression towards other
9

ethnicities. Likewise, Solomon and Saucier (2006) analyzed the effects of tolerance-promoting
events and found that they were effective in reducing participants’ feelings of animosity and
increasing their cultural acceptance. These studies exemplify the importance of cultural and
ethnic tolerance on an individual basis, which can be utilized and applied on a state level.
Alternatively when looking at a state level case study on cultural/ethnic tolerance Hodson
et al. (1994) showed that in Yugoslavia, areas where ethnic intolerance was high, the amount of
conflict was also high. Here, heterogeneity (diversity) and intergroup contact promoted tolerance
in Eastern European states. Subsequently, Moore Jr. (2001) found that maritime trade and “the
freedom of conscience” increased ethnic/religious tolerance, which in turn reduced violence. In
both of the above cases, intergroup contact promoted peace amongst ethnic groups. The more
groups began to trade amongst each other or come into contact altogether trust and bonds were
learned, in other words, tolerance was learned, in turn promoting peace.
Moreover, state efforts to promote cultural tolerance include the treatment of minority
groups within those states, such as granting them the same rights and respect as the majority
group. McIntosh, et al. (1995) rationalized that the treatment of minority groups within the states
of Romania and Bulgaria will correlate with the amount of ethnic conflict there. Likewise, the
factors that attribute to ethnic tolerance are pivotal to the strategy of a state in promoting or
strengthening tolerance statewide. Political ideology, perceptions of threat, age and education
have all been found to influence the degree of ethnic tolerance within Romania and Bulgaria
(McIntosh et al., 1995). Citizen regime type and ethnic tolerance have also been proposed to hold
a strong relationship with one another, specifically along the lines of political ideology,
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satisfaction with democracy, as well as national identity (Weldon, 2006). Henceforth, the above
factors can be utilized by countries to promote ethnic tolerance.
Furthermore, central to my theory is Kazakhstan’s promotion of cultural tolerance.
Although many believed that after the fall of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan would face severe
ethnic conflict due to the diverse ethnic population residing there as well as structural instability
during that time, the opposite actually happened. On the contrary the integration of all ethnicities
and policies used to promote ethnic tolerance managed to keep the peace in Kazakhstan amongst
all ethnic groups (Schatz, 2000). Kazakhstan’s case illuminates the importance of cultural
tolerance promotion in combating ethnic conflict. The next section explains the theoretical
elements of this piece.
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CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL ELEMENTS

To what extent do state efforts to promote cultural tolerance and cohesiveness help in
preventing ethnic conflict? I argue that state efforts to promote cultural tolerance and
cohesiveness are inversely related to the likelihood of ethnic conflict. This is because just as
ethnic identity is a learned concept, tolerance of other ethnicities and cultures can also be taught
and implemented structurally as a tactic to combat and prevent ethnic conflict vis-à-vis state
efforts. Having respect for cultural and ethnic differences is pivotal in creating successful
policies aimed at inter-ethnic conflict prevention (Laubeova, 2000). Better understanding the
factors that correlate with ethnic tolerance can equip states with better strategies in implementing
tolerance related policies. When an ethnic group is respected, embraced, and included within a
government there is less incentive for that ethnic group to rise up against the government or want
to initiate conflict. The default setting for this analysis is in post-Soviet multiethnic states that
have one predominant majority ethnic group. The assumption here is that, even in multiethnic
societies when there is one dominant ethnic group this naturally creates risk or tension for all
other ethnic groups (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000). Therefore it is up to the state to alleviate this and
insure all ethnic groups feel equal and safe through the promotion of cultural tolerance. The state
can promote cultural tolerance through its own actions such as recognizing the language of an
ethnic group, having reserved parliamentary seats for all ethnic groups, granting constitutional
protection of all ethnic groups, and implementing inclusive citizenship laws for all ethnic groups.
12

These actions by the state demonstrate that all ethnic groups are tolerated and encouraged to be
active members of society, which simultaneously sets an example for the majority ethnic group
to also be tolerant and inclusive of all other ethnicities. The end goal here is not cultural
assimilation, or ethnofederalism, but rather peaceful cohabitation or co-existence by building up
cultural tolerance within the state.
I argue that a state is more likely to face ethnic conflicts when state efforts to promote
cultural tolerance and cohesiveness are tenuous or absent. State efforts to promote cultural
tolerance include: 1) insuring each ethnic group has a voice within the government through
parliamentary reserved seats or other political representation. Political representation gives
ethnic groups a voice to be a heard and a sense of importance, this has been argued to decrease
ethnic conflict greatly (Reynal-Querol, 2002). Due to the existence of corruption in former
Soviet states resulting in an elite concentration of power, one could argue there is no substantial
say for anyone other than the president. Nonetheless it is the “thought” or gesture of
parliamentary reserved seats or any other form of political representation that provides the ethnic
group with a positive signal of importance and equality. 2) Granting all minorities’ equal rights
and protection under the constitution, this instills a sense of security (Posen, 1993) for the
minority group knowing that they are protected under a legally binding document, especially one
as pivotal as a state’s constitution. 3) Language recognition-when a state recognizes the language
of an ethnic group this too sends a positive signal that a major part of the groups’ identity is
respected and accepted (Ellingsen, 2000). 4) Finally, non-rigorous citizenship obtainment;
citizenship, and barriers to citizenship for members of an ethnic group is definitive of how the
state treats all ethnic groups as far as inclusion, and is essential in cultural tolerance policies
13

(Laitin, 1998). If rules and regulations for obtaining citizenship are difficult or complicated this
signals to different ethnic groups that the titular group may want them to leave rather than
integrate (Laitin, 1998). Of course this feeling of exclusion can result in tension for the minority
groups in turn motivating them to engage in conflict. In contrast, if citizenship obtainment is not
difficult, this signals to the ethnic group that they are welcome and tolerated.
Hypothesis: State efforts to promote cultural tolerance and cohesiveness are inversely related to
the likelihood of ethnic conflict.
Independent variable: State efforts in promoting cultural tolerance
Dependent Variable: Ethnic conflict.
Unit of analysis: Dyads (pairing between state and ethnic group)
I predict that poor state efforts (or lack of) to promote cultural tolerance and cohesiveness
within a state will have a positive effect on the amount of ethnic conflicts that state will have. I
theorize this because once a state begins to engage in non-nationalistic behavior or simply does
promote the tolerance of diversity, then in turn the citizens of the said state will begin to follow
this pattern. Akin to the way that one’s ethnicity or ethnic identity is a learned concept, tolerance
of other ethnicities and cultures can also be taught and utilized as a preventative strategy towards
ethnic conflict. The former Soviet Union extends an interesting case study for analyzing ethnic
conflict. This region provides the most likely case in illuminating the impact of cultural tolerance
on ethnic conflict. All post-Soviet states share a common Russo-Imperial history where they
were taken over by Russia and integrated into the Soviet Union. The fifteen post-Soviet republics
also present enough variation in ethnic make up, for instance Russia is more ethnically diverse
while countries such as Estonia are more homogenous. All of the post-Soviet republics had to
14

adopt the Russian language as a primary official language, and culturally assimilate to a Russocommunist society, in this sense the countries share a similar past. Ethnic conflict however, is
experienced differently throughout the region. The states that put forth more effort in cultural
tolerance strategies and inclusiveness should experience less conflict. While the post-Soviet
states that had a more nationalistic, and exclusionary agenda should experience higher ethnic
conflict. The next section explains the quantitative approach in testing the cultural tolerance
theory.
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CHAPTER FOUR: QUANTITATIVE MEASURES
Cultural tolerance theory is assessed via an analysis of correlation between cultural
tolerance and ethnic conflict occurrence through a large N logit regression. More specifically a
time-series cross-sectional model is exercised. The logit model is used because it works best for
binary dependent variables. Dyads of the state and a specific ethnic group remain the unit of
analysis because this reflects the ethnic conflict definition as uprisings against the government;
therefore state-ethnic group dyads are employed accordingly. Standard errors are clustered to the
dyad to assuage the assumption of independent observations across time within the same dyad.
In other words, standard errors account for interdependence within dyads across time. The
dataset extends from 1991 (after the fall of the Soviet Union) to 2014, to show trends over time,
and includes 104 dyads. The dataset contains country, dyad, year, four different variables that
represent cultural tolerance (independent variable), and conflict occurrence (dependent variable).
As for case selection I collect data from all of the 15 former Soviet republics 1. I utilize the
AMAR Minorities at Risk (Birnir et al., 2015) dataset for the various ethnic groups within each
country, which comes to 55 ethnic groups total.
These ethnic groups were chosen based off a threshold: the smallest ethnic group in Russia
that has been linked to a conflict through the ACD2EPR dataset (since Russia is the largest
country out of the former Soviet Union). This ethnic group is the Nogai with a population of
about 103,660, equating to roughly .072% of Russia’s total population. Every ethnic group that is
1 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan

16

included in this dataset has reached the .072% threshold from the total population of that specific
country. With 55 2 ethnic groups employed in the dataset paired with each individual state, it
provides 104 dyads to test with 2496 observations in total. The states within the dataset account
for the dominant ethnic group within that state, because the central government is generally a
monopoly or dominated by a particular ethnic majority group (EPR Core, 2014).
Both the Uppsala (UCDP) and ACD2EPR databases are implemented to measure ethnic
conflict occurrence, this way both large and small-scale ethnic conflicts are accounted for. Ethnic
conflict is defined as any incident of maintained violent conflict where ethnic, national, religious,
or alternative communal minorities push for changes in status through challenging the
government (Bates et. al, 2003). Here, conflict occurrence is mainly state-minority group
conflicts, with the exception of the Kyrgyz-Uzbek conflict where the involvement of the state is
still up for debate (although there is much evidence pointing to the involvement (Hill & Huskey,
2010; Hanks 2011; Laruelle 2012). The ethnic conflict variable is coded as binary 0 or 1, 0
meaning there was no ethnic conflict between the specific dyad within the given year, and a 1 if
there was.
To calibrate cultural tolerance into the data, 4 separate variables are calculated and
originally coded. The four criteria cultural tolerance variables consist of: 1) Is the language of the
ethnic group recognized by the state; this is vital in that language is a major fundamental part of
ethnic identity (Ellingsen, 2000), when a language is recognized by the state it shows the ethnic
group that a major part of their identity is recognized and to an extent respected. 2) Is the ethnic
2 The 55 ethnic groups included: Abkhazians, Adzhars, Adyghe, Kabardins, Armenians, Avars, Azeris, Bashkirs, Belorussians,
Buryats, Bulgarians, Chechens, Chuvash, Crimean Russians, Crimean Tatars, Dargins, Dungan/Hui, Gagauz, Georgians,
Germans, Hungarians, Ingush, Jewish, Kalmyks, Balkars, Karakalpaks, Karachay, Kazaks, Kazakhs, Komi, Komi-Permyak,
Koreans, Kumyks, Laks, Lezgins, Lithuanian, Maris, Moldovans, Ossetians, Pamiris, Polish, Roma, Romanians, Russians,
Tabasarans, Tajiks, Talysh, Tatars, Tuvinians, Udmurts, Ukrainians, Uyghurs, Uzbeks, Yakuts, and Yazidi.

17

group protected under the constitution of the state; this ensures the ethnic group that it is
protected or secure (Posen, 1993) by a legally binding document and creates legitimacy and
reassurance for the ethnic group. After coding was completed however all of the dyads received
the same score for this variable, henceforth due to lack of variance constitutional protection was
excluded from the regression model. 3) Are there minority reserved parliamentary seats for the
ethnic group within the state; this takes legitimacy one step further by not only stating that the
ethnic group has a voice in the government but it actually proves that the ethnic group has a
voice within the government and therefore matters (Reynal-Querol, 2002). 4) Are there barriers
to citizenship for members of this ethnic group, are some of these stronger than others; this is
definitive of how the state treats all ethnicities and is pivotal in cultural tolerance (Laitin, 1998).
Each of the four criteria variables received its own score from 0 to 3 signifying low (0) to
high (3) “cultural tolerance” for that specific variable. Beginning with language recognition, all
recorded data was obtained from Ethnologue and further investigated by country specific
constitutions. Then the next criterion was constitutional protection, data was gathered directly
from each country specific official constitution. Furthermore, parliamentary seats reserved for
the specific ethnic group was measured as binary, 0 or 3. Data for this variable was recorded
from the official parliament/government websites of each country, and country specific official
constitutions. The fourth and last criterion was citizenship barriers/inclusiveness, all data
recorded for citizenship was obtained from official country specific constitutions, and
legislationline.org, which is sponsored by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights. All four variables of cultural tolerance are measured equally at four points from
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0-3; this ascertains that the variables are ranked fairly as they are all equally weighed. All of the
coding specifics are included in the codebook for reference.
All of the control variables are replicated data from a working paper by Konstantin Ash and
Fanglu Sun, “Inequality in Public Service Provision and Ethnic Rebellion.” Where ethnic group
borders from 1961 Atlas Narodov Mira (ANM) (Bruk et al., 1964) were geocoded into polygons
from Cederman et al. (2010) in the GREG (Geo-referencing of ethnic groups) dataset. This data
is advantageous in that it uses ArcGIS to map the level of wealth geographically in regions
throughout the world, aligning with the ethnic make up of the area-making it the closest way to
measure exact inequality amongst ethnic groups. The ethnic group data matches well onto the
dyads specified from my dataset. The data also allows for a more precise means of controlling
for alternative variables.

Controls
There are a plethora of plausible factors leading to less ethnic conflict, therefore I control for a
multitude of them. Public service provision has been linked to ethnic conflict onset; electricity is
a key component of public service provision and can be represented through intergroup light
intensity (Barnes & Floor, 1996). Light intensity captures the intensity of nighttime lights
coming from one square kilometer globally, and is quantified into geocoded quadrants
(DMSP/OLS). Taking this light intensity at the country level and dividing it by a country’s
population density produces country light density. Light intensity at the group level divided by
group density (population density of specific ethnic group per geographic area) produces group
19

light density. Therefore, I control for this with lights inequality, which is a log of group light
density divided by country light density, a straightforward measure of variance from the national
average. The measure was made to balance out extreme values in light deviation and normalize
the inequality measure around zero. Elevation provides ethnic groups with more “rough terrain”
also resulting in a higher chance for conflict onset (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Therefore I control
for this using a measure of mean group elevation, elevation mean. The averages for each ethnic
group were generated from ArcGIS utilizing the Global Digital Elevation Model, capturing
values by a 30 square kilometer resolution global grid (Survey, 2006). Accessibility is important
for the inclusion of all groups and a key component of this is state penetration or government
rule reaching throughout its territory, therefore groups farther away from the capital city may be
more likely to initiate conflict. The average distance to a country’s capital per ethnic group I
control for using capital distance mean -developed using data from PRIO-GRID (Tollefsen et
al., 2012). The smaller an ethnic group is relative to a country’s total population the less likely it
is to initiate conflict (Caselli & Ii, 2006). Subsequently, group size is a variable used to represent
the population of an ethnic group within a given territory divided by the total population of the
country. Log population is also controlled for which is a log of the country’s population count
(SEDAC Gridded Population Data).
Typically, countries with higher GDP per capita income experience less conflict (Fearon
& Laitin, 2003; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). Accordingly, I control for this utilizing a logged
measure of GDP per capita- Log of per capita GDP, national wealth per capita is obtained from
the Penn World Tables, this provides a national measure (Heston et al., 2002). To control for
group level economic inequality data is taken from the 2006 Nordhaus et. al G-Econ project,
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which is a geophysical based dataset for economic activity. The G-Econ data covers gross cell
product (the regional equivalent of gross domestic product), and dividing this by population
density gives us the economic density. Thus, I control for Group Economic Density divided by
Country Economic Density (Nordhaus et. al, 2006), which gives me the Economic Deviation, in
order to standardize this measure I use the log as economic inequality, or gross cell product
inequality, accounting for group level inequality. Furthermore, proximity to petroleum or
diamond deposits can affect ethnic conflict occurrence (Grossman, 1995). Henceforth I control
for this proximity with petroleum distance, where distances to both diamond deposits and
petroleum from the ethnic group region (Lujala et al., 2007, 2005) are employed in the models.
Finally, I control for peace years 1-3 or cubic polynomials (Carter & Signorino, 2010), which are
added to account for duration dependence (one year’s observation is impacted by the prior year
and so on). Peace years are a constant measure of the number of years since the ethnic group
was last involved in conflict where measures two and three are squared and cubed measures of
the first. Cubic polynomial approximation to the hazard is as follows: 𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ) = 𝑥𝑥1 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥2 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖2 +

𝑥𝑥3 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖3 by utilizing this specific technique deciphering temporal dependence is more precise.
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CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS
The results render some interesting discoveries, however, it is important to note that the
variable of constitutional protection was omitted from the regression models due to lack of
variance amongst dyads throughout time. Below, four models or versions are presented: two
without controls (models 1 and 3), and two with controls (models 2 and 4), standard errors are
clustered to the dyad in models 3 and 4, finally the peace years (1-3) represent cubic
polynomials, which are used in each model.

Table 1 Logit Regressions
Variables

Ethnic Conflict
Language Recognition
Minority Seats
Citizenship

Model 1
Ethnic
Conflict

Model 2
Ethnic
Conflict

Model 3
Ethnic
Conflict

Model 4
Ethnic
Conflict

0.739***
(0.120)
-0.303*
(0.150)
-0.760***
(0.150)

0.717***
(0.208)
-0.107
(0.275)
-0.680*
(0.309)
-1.161*
(0.464)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.001)
-0.425
(3.796)
-0.362
(0.364)
0.821*

0.739***
(0.152)
-0.303
(0.189)
-0.760***
(0.167)

0.717***
(0.186)
-0.107
(0.174)
-0.680**
(0.245)
-1.161**
(0.394)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.000)
-0.425
(1.955)
-0.362
(0.207)
0.821**

Lights Inequality
Elevation Mean
Capital Distance Mean
Group Size
Log of Country Population Count
Log of per capita GDP
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Variables

Model 1

Model 2
(0.415)
-0.344*
(0.139)
-0.780

Model 3

Model 4
(0.257)
-0.344**
(0.114)
-0.780

-2.574***
(0.224)
0.254***
(0.028)
-0.007***
(0.001)

-3.067***
(0.347)
0.315***
(0.044)
-0.009***
(0.001)

-2.574***
(0.299)
0.254***
(0.037)
-0.007***
(0.001)

-3.067***
(0.603)
0.315***
(0.063)
-0.009***
(0.002)

0.621

(0.551)
-0.149

0.621

(0.451)
-0.149

(0.340)

(5.939)

(0.621)

(3.667)

2496

1793

2496

1793

Economic Inequality
Petroleum Distance
Time Since Last Ethnic Conflict
Peaceyears2
Peaceyears3

‑Constant

Number of Observations
*

p < 0.05,

**

p < 0.01,

***

p < 0.001 Standard Errors are clustered to the dyad in models 3 and 4 only.

Model 1 illustrates the significance of all three independent variables used to signify
cultural tolerance with a negative effect for language recognition. For every one unit increase in
language recognition the probability of ethnic conflict increases by almost 74%, where the p
value is less than 0.001, this not only significant but also counterintuitive from the original
theory. Next for every one unit increase in minority seats the likelihood of ethnic conflict
decreases by 30% where the p value is smaller than 0.05, however this significance no longer
holds when the controls are added in. Nevertheless, for every one unit increase in the citizenship
variable the prospect of ethnic conflict decreases by 76% with a p value less than 0.001, which is
significant and remains through regression models 2-4.
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Model 2 highlights the significance of language recognition, where for every one-unit
increase in language recognition the probability of ethnic conflict increases by 71%, with a p
value less than 0.001. Minority seats however loses its significance once the controls are added
in, now rendering a 10% decrease in ethnic conflict per every one unit increase in minority
reserved seats. Citizenship shows significance with a p value less than 0.05 where for every oneunit increase in citizenship ethnic conflict decreases by 68%. Model 3 does not contain the
control variables however as the standard errors are clustered the percentages change from
Model 2 and resemble Model 1’s values, however minority seats remains insignificant. All in all,
Model 4 utilizes all of the control variables and standard errors are clustered to the dyad.
Language recognition similar to Model 2 presents a 71% increase in ethnic conflict per every
one-unit increase in language recognition with a p value of less than 0.001. Minority seats
variable shows an 11% decrease in ethnic conflict for every one-unit increase in minority
reserved seats. Citizenship exhibits a 68% decrease in ethnic conflict for every one-unit increase
in citizenship, and here the p value is less than 0.01, meaning the significance is stronger than in
Model 2. As for the control variables it seems lights inequality, elevation mean, log gdp, and
economic inequality are significant in both Models 2 and 4.
The findings still point to cultural tolerance as a plausible solution to ethnic conflict,
however there are key points to be noted. One of the variable was untestable, one was not
significant and two were significant (with one holding a negative correlation). Constitutional
protection of ethnic groups is omitted from the results due to lack of variance across time,
meaning all of the dyads had the same score and therefore could not be properly tested.
Language recognition is shown to correlate with ethnic conflict in a negative context. Perhaps,
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when recognizing the language of an ethnic group, more autonomy is felt by the group, in turn
leading to a want for independence versus integration. Minority seats has some significance in
the early model but this is lost as the controls are added, the effect here could be lost because
Kazakhstan is the only country that has minority reserved seats (along with Lithuania for the
Poles) out of the sample. In any case political representation could still be considered as a
preventative strategy against ethnic conflict because it has produced significant results in other
studies when the ethnic group has an effective influence in legislative decision-making (Alonso
& Rufino, 2007). As mentioned above the only two states that had minority reserved political
representation were Kazakhstan and Lithuania, which is perhaps why the results lost
significance. Furthermore, citizenship shows a positive correlation with ethnic conflict
throughout the models. The inclusiveness for less difficult citizenship deters ethnic conflict
because it signals to any ethnic group that they are welcome in that country. The next section
discusses the results through case studies in order to understand the results and analyze where,
why, and how they hold up in real world examples.
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CHAPTER SIX: CASE STUDIES AND IMPLICATIONS
Constitutional protection for minority ethnic groups signals that they are secure and safe as
protection is guaranteed via a legally binding document (Posen, 1993). Nevertheless, due to lack
of variance across time for each dyad for the constitutional protection variable its significance
was untestable. Each dyad within the dataset received a score of 1 for constitutional protection,
implying that the constitution did contain language that ensures protection of all minorities and
peoples as a whole, but does not specify or mention the specific group at hand. Moreover, there
are studies claiming language differences may cause ethnic conflict, or by the same token can be
used to mitigate ethnic conflict (Mac Giolla Chriost, 2003), and that the greater the language
difference between two groups the smaller the chances are for conflict onset (Laitin, 2000).
However, the data proves a counterintuitive finding: more language recognition leads to a greater
probability of ethnic conflict. Perhaps this is due to the sense of autonomy that is felt when the
language of an ethnic group is recognized, leading to a greater demand for independence from
the majority ethnic group dominate state, which can result into conflict when the state does not
comply. In other words language recognition can fall into the spectrum of ethnofederalism,
where greater autonomy is given to the ethnic minority group within its jurisdiction.
Ethnofederalism, although thought of as a useful means to achieve peace, on the contrary has
been linked to exacerbating conflict if not instigating it (Roeder, 2009).
A real life example of the language recognition results is Russia’s calamitous relationship
with the ethnic Chechens. The Chechens live in the Caucasus region and are a predominantly
Muslim ethnic group (Russell, 2005). In 1858 after a long history of resistance dating back to the
17th century, Russia finally conquered Chechnya; conflict however, did not end there (BBC,
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2015). In 1929 the Chechens rebelled against Soviet uniformity and for the next decade
Chechnya was booming with conflict and repression. Consequently, Soviet intrigue grew for the
region as it was ripe with oil and Russians were brought there to oversee the oil industry, not to
mention rumors that the Chechens were collaborating with the Germans during World War II
added even more reason for the Russians to be present there (Kipp, 2001). As a result of the
chaos Joseph Stalin, one of the former leaders of the Soviet Union, proposed what he deemed as
a “solution” to these issues, and ordered for the mass deportation of ethnic Chechens to
Kazakhstan and Siberia. The exile was carried out in 1944 however Nikita Khrushchev another
former Soviet leader proclaimed that the Chechens were free to return to their homeland in 1957
(Russell, 2005). The animosity that grew from this exile only added to the already existent
grievances of being imperialized by the Russians. In 1958 ethnic riots broke out in Grozny,
which began a ripple of riots that continued until 1965 (BBC, 2012). Soon followed the policy of
glasnost in the 1980s and nationalist rights movements began to surface all over the U.S.S.R.
including Chechnya prompting its self-determination campaign (PBS, 2002). In November of
1990 Chechnya demanded parliamentary and presidential elections, as part of its separatist
movement (PBS, 2002). In 1991 Soviet air force general Jokhar Dudayev seized the KGB
headquarters in Grozny, forcing Moscow to offer the elections, and Dudayev won presidency.
After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Chechnya decreed a Declaration of State
Sovereignty. In 1992 Chechnya adopted its constitution and declared itself as an independent and
self-governing entity with a president and parliament (BBC, 2011). The Chechen language was
then recognized because it became the official language within Chechnya’s jurisdiction, which
added to Chechnya’s autonomy movement that motivated Chechnya to rebel. Almost two years
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later (1994) Russia invades Chechnya in order to end the independence movement and so rebegan ethnic conflict. Yeltsin dispatched troops to enter Chechen territory and up to 100,000
people were killed in that war, which lasted until 1996 (BBC, 2011). In 1996 former president of
Chechnya Dudayev was assassinated from a Russian missile attack, and Russia signed a briefly
lived peace treaty with new president Zemlikhan Yandarbiyev, who was president until 1997.
Interestingly enough in 1997 Russia recognized Maskhadov’s government and him as the
Chechen president, even so the ethnic conflict was not ended but only contained for a brief
period. Not too long after in 1999 a second large-scale ethnic conflict was initiated, after
Vladimir Putin came into power in Russia and led a military operation against the Chechen
rebels (Al-Jazeera, 2014). Both sides of the conflict felt atrocities such as torture, kidnapping,
rape, and summary executions from the side of the Russian troops. While the Chechens, also
conducted kidnappings, killing of civilians and colossal revenge attacks (Kramer, 2004). Ten
years down the road Russia officially ceases its military operation against the Chechens,
nonetheless conflict still persists even currently and relations remain unstable (Al-Jazeera, 2014).
Autonomy created a channel for deep-rooted grievances and a stronger national identity,
and perhaps without language recognition it would not have fallen into that (Cornell, 2002). The
Russia-Chechen dyad exemplifies a case where language recognition did not lead to less conflict,
however the Chechen culture was not exactly tolerated by the Russian state either. The ethnic
cleansing that took place is a leading example of high cultural intolerance by Russia. From the
dawn of their post-Soviet conflicts, Russia to its own population and international community
began to portray Chechens as “bandits”, “terrorists”, deeming their entire regime as “criminal,”
demonizing the ethnic Chechen group, as well engaging in countless human rights violations
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within the region (Russell, 2002). Negative ethnic propaganda was employed on both sides,
where Russia did not want the Chechens to have full sovereignty. Dudayev (the then leader of
Chechnya) used ethnicity as a tool to start an uprising for the gaining of sovereignty, utilizing
propaganda in his fight for autonomy (Russell, 2005). Dudayev went after policies that revolved
around ethnic exclusion, establishing nationalist policies, and wanted to achieve succession from
Russia at all costs, willing to sacrifice the lives of many (Sharafitdinova, 2000). It seems on both
ends there was a major absence of efforts to promote cultural tolerance. Perhaps if Russia had
been more open to the ethnic Chechens and promoted tolerance within the nation as well as in its
relations with Chechnya (almost akin to her methods with the Tatars) the Chechens would feel as
though they are an equal and important part of Russia and ethnic conflict would have never
occurred. The ethnofederalist approach to lessen conflict does not represent the integral method
of practicing cultural tolerance by a state, and language recognition is but one part of the cultural
tolerance theory. Perhaps language recognition can produce negative outcomes when
ethnofederalism is the end goal of a minority group, but is offset by the other three variables.
According to the results citizenship has a positive effect on ethnic conflict where the more
inclusionary and less difficult citizenship requirements decrease the probability of ethnic
conflict. Transnistria is a prime example of this where the citizenship requirements in Moldova
are the strictest in comparison to the remaining former Soviet states. The feeling of exclusion
signaled from complex citizenship requirements as well as the other exclusionary factors in
Moldova paved the way for the Russians and Ukrainians to rebel within the territory. The events
leading up to the Transnistrian War hold much merit in understanding the exclusionary tactics of
Moldova. In the early 16th to 19th century, the Moldovan territory was fought over by various
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powers, with the main opponents being Russia and the Ottomans (BBC, 2012). Eventually
(1878) the Ottomans recognize Romania, which included western Moldova. In 1918 after the
Bolshevik revolution within Russia, Bessarabia (eastern Moldova) calls for independence and a
union with Romania, the Treaty of Paris in 1920 approves the union however the Bolsheviks did
not (Vahl & Emerson, 2004). The Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic is then
established in 1924, and in 1940 Russia completely annexes Bessarabia joining it with the
Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. The new republic was renamed the Moldavian
Soviet Socialist Republic. It has been argued that this new identity of “Moldovans” was created
by Joseph Stalin in order to justify the incorporation of a new nation state into the U.S.S.R. In
fact, the Moldovans were now considered a separate ethnic group from Romanians, even made to
write in Cyrillic instead of traditional Latin letters (Heintz, 2005).
From 1941 to 1945 a Romanian regime was temporarily set up in Moldova after the Nazi
attack on the Soviet Union; only to be driven out by Soviet forces right before the end of World
War II (BBC, 2012). During the 1980s when Mikhail Gorbachev came into power Moldovan
nationalism was resurrected in compliance with Gorbachev's "openness" era. As with other
Soviet Republics Moldova declares itself a sovereign state in 1990, and gains full independence
in 1991 (BBC, 2012). Although the Constitution was officially adopted in 1994, Moldova's
Parliament ratified its official laws on citizenship in turn institutionalizing them on June 5th 1991
(Rotaru, 2014). Of course the 1991 citizenship laws allowed for Soviet Moldovan citizens to
remain citizens of Moldova, where they had up to a year to decide either to keep or renounce
their citizenship (Rotaru, 2014). Moldova is one of the few post-Soviet states that received a
score of zero for citizenship requirements meaning its citizenship laws are of the most
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exclusionary in comparison to the other states. For example Moldova requires a 10-year
consecutive residency, a test to show knowledge of the Moldovan Constitutional provisions, a
language proficiency test, lawful proof of income, and a renouncing of any other citizenship for
people seeking citizenship through naturalization (legislationline.org). The language proficiency
test subsists of the following criteria: the individual must sufficiently comprehend both
conversational language as well as official information, answer and be able to discuss inquiries
on social life in Moldova, read and be able to sufficiently comprehend any given text of laws,
social nature, and other regulations, as well as write a narrative regarding a social topic
(legislationline.org; Embassy of Moldova).
The citizenship laws were pivotal in that they contributed to the nationalistic movement
that was taking place in Moldova since the 1980s, adding more burden to the already uneasy
tensions between the ethnic Moldovans and predominantly Slavic (Russian and Ukrainian)
population residing in Transnistria. The Gagauz were also involved in the ethnic conflict, who
are a Turkic speaking Orthodox Christian group predominantly in southern Moldova (Minorities
at Risk, 2010). The ethnic conflict (Transnistrian war) that broke out in Moldova was a byproduct of the nationalist uprising over issues revolving around language, identity, and culture
(Waters, 1997). The political divisions in Moldova grew strong, as those on the east bank of the
Dnister were pro-Russia, while those on the west bank were pro-Moldova. In 1989 in response to
the language law in Moldova the Gagauz formed the Gagauzi Movement as well as their first
congress leading to the creation of the Gagauz Autonomous SSR inside of Moldova (Minorities
At Risk, 2010). In 1990 delegates from the Gagauz region and Transnistria held a meeting with
the Supreme Soviet officials and demanded regional autonomy, this request was of course denied
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and deemed as treasonable but both formed their own republics anyway; Gagauz Republic, and
Dnestr Moldovian Republic. Henceforth, violence broke out in fall of 1990, which persisted
sporadically until it blossomed into a full-blown war in March 1992 (U.S. Library of Congress).
The Moldovan government attempted to disarm the Transnistrian separatists who had the support
of Russia’s 14th army, eventually the war ended with a ceasefire in July 1992 (U.S. Library of
Congress). The largely Russian speaking Slavic population of Transnistria saw the presence of
the Russian army as protection and did not want their ethnic identity to be overwhelmed by the
rest of Moldova seeing as how they made sure to break away from Russia and establish or
resurrect their own ethnic identity, which included culture and language changes (The World
Post). Perhaps the exclusionary citizenship laws only exacerbated the nationalist uprising and
identity crisis that lead to ethnic conflict, which is highly supported by the regression results.
Similarly since the results render for more inclusionary and less difficult citizenship laws to
decrease the probability of ethnic conflict occurrence Kazakhstan can be taken as an exemplary
model. As argued by Schatz (2000) Kazakhstan presented more favorable policies that carried a
familiarity to the “Soviet era categories of cultural harmony.” The inclusive citizenship laws
highlighted the more inclusive agenda of the state towards the ethnic Russians. Kazakhstan
received a score of 3 from 1991 to 2014, deeming the states citizenship laws as highly
inclusionary. In 1993 Kazakhstan officially adopted it’s constitution and from 1991-1992 the
citizenship laws were the same as Soviet times therefore open, which remained the case after the
constitution was implemented (Makaryan, 2006). When Kazakhstan ratified its constitution in
1993, the citizenship laws were also institutionalized-where individuals seeking citizenship
through naturalization have to have a 5-year continuous residency (3 years if married to a
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citizen) and there are no history, language, constitutional tests, or alternative requirements
(legislationline.org). The inclusive citizenship laws that Kazakhstan kept even after
independence were pivotal because during that time ethnic Russians were facing much
discrimination in other post-Soviet states such as Estonia, Latvia, and even Moldova (Laitin,
1998). These Baltic States felt that Russian imperialism during Soviet times was unjust and
forced onto them. Estonia did not grant citizenship to ethnic Russians who were citizens during
Soviet times, Latvia as well because they felt occupied by the Russians during Soviet times and
believed that all of Russia’s actions were done illegally therefore the Russian people should not
be legal citizens. In 1991, Latvia even adopted a parliamentary guideline that did not permit
ethnic Russians to apply for citizenship for at least 16 years (Laitin, 1998). Kazakhstan’s
inclusive citizenship laws signaled to the Russians that they are still welcome even after the
Soviet Union was no more. Kazakhstan also felt Russian imperialism heavily and could have
carried the same grievances as the Baltic States, but it did not. Kazakhstan has proven to be a key
example of a state whose efforts promote cultural tolerance, keeping ethnic conflict at an all time
low. Following the collapse of the U.S.S.R., Kazakhstan’s salient cultural diversity was
presented as a hindrance on nation and state building. Indeed, ethnic tensions were heightened in
the northern regions where the majority of the population was Russian, which placed pressure on
Kazakhstan to integrate the area into the Russian Federation, and it did not help that in Russia a
Nobel Prize winning author insisted on this movement (Schatz, 2000).
Contrary to the predictions of many Western analysts however, Kazakhstan was able to
transition into an independent state while still accommodating the needs and rights of all ethnic
groups within the country not just the Russians, therefore ethnic conflict did not erupt (Schatz,
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2000). Rather, Kazakhstan took on an internationalist approach to state building keeping
nationalistic and ethno-centric tendencies at bay. For instance, Dario Citati from the Institute of
Advance Studies in Geopolitics and Auxiliaries Sciences for OSCE, highlighted Kazakhstan
refusing to take on a state approach allocated on ethnic nationalism. Citati applauded Kazakhstan
in its remarkable attempt to be respectful towards all ethnicities with a solution based on
pragmatism, he explained, “the same fact that at the moment of independence the Kazakh nation
did not represent the majority of population had prompted the authorities to promote interethnic
tolerance and even to counter some expressions of Kazakh nationalism. The key of the State
ideology is the distinction between the “Kazakh identity” (referred to specific Kazakh culture)
and the “Kazakhstanian identity” (based on citizenship and shared values independently from
ethnic belonging) (OSCE, 2016).
These examples of peaceful efforts with the Russians in the country show why ethnic
conflict has not blossomed in Kazakhstan. Although there was a large emigration of Russians out
of Kazakhstan after the fall of the Soviet Union, this was due to solely economic reasons, rather
than ethno-nationalism (Bandey & Rather, 2013). Even so Russians still populate Kazakhstan,
currently maintaining the size of second largest ethnic group after the Kazakhs themselves.
Russians are spread out throughout the country, however there are five northern districts within
Kazakhstan that are predominantly Russian. Even so, these majority Russian districts did not
form ethnic territorial administrations like Trans-Dniester area in Moldova, which I argue is due
to Kazakhstan’s national efforts to include Russians and promote cultural tolerance (Zadyrkhan,
2004). Furthermore, Kazakhstan’s language policies also made life easier for the post-Soviet
multiethnic population living there, especially the Russians. Instead of forcing language changes
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such as in Moldova, Russian was kept as an official language in all spheres of communication
and education. The integral method of cultural tolerance was utilized heavily in Kazakhstan with
the Russians, not only keeping relations peaceful but also it kept the majority Russian northern
part of Kazakhstan from officially attempting to secede (Schatz, 2000). Unlike the RussiaChechen case, language recognition played a positive role here, which is contrary to the
regression results. This could mean that language recognition causes more conflict in more
heavily populated ethnic minority regions, such as Chechnya (Roeder, 2009).
Indeed for minority reserved seats the results became insignificant once the control variables
were accounted for. However, there is still something to be taken away here from Kazakhstan’s
incorporation of minority-reserved parliament seats: the Peoples Assembly. Kazakhstan in
particular has incorporated cultural tolerance into its political system through the National
Assembly of People of Kazakhstan (APK). This model can be used in all post-Soviet states to
help integrate a balance of harmony amongst ethnic groups.
The activities of the National Assembly of people of Kazakhstan (APK) reads as follows:
An important element of the political system of Kazakhstan, strengthens interests
of all ethnic groups, to ensure the strict observe of the rights and freedoms of
citizens irrespective of their ethnic affiliation became the Assembly of People of
Kazakhstan, created March 1st, 1995 on the initiative of the President of the
country N.A. Nazarbayev. The idea of creation was announced by the President of
Kazakhstan in 1992 at the first Forum of People of Kazakhstan. Activities of the
Assembly of People of Kazakhstan is aimed at implementation of the state
national policy, ensuring socio-political stability in the country and improving the
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efficiency of cooperation between state institutions and civil society in the sphere
of interethnic relations (Assembly.kz, 2016).
OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Astrid Thors proclaimed that the APK plays
a rare and historic role in Kazakhstan’s commitment to inter-ethnic stability (OSCE, 2015).
Thors stressed consultative and parliamentarian bodies such as the APK are pivotal in
developing and implementing laws and policies that advocate cultural/ethnic tolerance as well as
the integration of societies, which not only helped in keeping peaceful relations with the Russian
population but also all other ethnic groups in Kazakhstan. Thors also highlighted that great
obstacles remain in integrating national minorities elsewhere in Central Asia and post-Soviet
states (OSCE, 2015). Saodat Olimova of the Sharq Research Centre at the OSCE High-Level
Conference on Tolerance and Non-Discrimination also praised Kazakhstan’s efforts; Olimova
reported the states within the region have managed to support and maintain interethnic peace,
deeming Kazakhstan as the greatest success story from the former Soviet Union in this regard.
Olimova highlighted that the state policy in inter-ethnic relations in Kazakhstan, and the role of
the APK ensures the rights of all ethnic groups generating an atmosphere of social tolerance in
turn keeping relations peaceful with the Russian population and other ethnic groups (OSCE,
2013).
The above three cases illustrate the findings from the results; Chechnya depicted a case
where language recognition tied into ethnofederalism and lead to ethnic conflict. Furthermore,
the Moldova case exemplified how exclusionary citizenship laws played into a nationalistic
movement resulting in ethnic conflict, as concluded by the regression findings. Finally,
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Kazakhstan represents the positive effect that inclusionary citizenship laws have on ethnic
conflict occurrence, and demonstrates the appropriate state efforts in cultural tolerance strategies.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION
The prevention of ethnic conflict is still a developing concept that can vary in its
effectiveness in different methods from case to case. Take the successor states of the former
Soviet Union as an example, where ethnic conflict has been prevented in some countries but not
in others, even though the states share a fairly similar Soviet history and ethnically driven
departure from Russia. Ethnic riots were widespread throughout the U.S.S.R. during its final
years, yet the ethnic tensions became ethnic conflict, carried over into the post-Soviet era in
some states, but not all. Kazakhstan is an interesting case because scholars were sure that ethnic
conflict would erupt and place a hindrance upon its state building and overall stability because of
its multiethnic population, Russian dominant northern region, and 1991 ethnic riots (Schatz,
2000). Ethnic conflict however did not occur as predicted, what could have caused this to
happen in Kazakhstan but not in other post-Soviet states?
This study proposes a theory of cultural tolerance for ethnic conflict prevention. Cultural
tolerance at the institutional and state level has been overlooked as a means to prevent ethnic
conflict. The four variables that were measured to represent cultural tolerance efforts from the
state side are: minority reserved seats, constitutional protection, citizenship laws, and language
recognition. Insuring each ethnic group has a voice within the government through parliamentary
reserved seats signals more than the notion that they are tolerated, but also that they are tolerated
enough to be represented in a political body within the states governmental sphere.
Constitutional protection gestures to the ethnic group, that the sole legally binding document the
state was built from, assures their protection, and if a group is protected they are also tolerated.
Citizenship laws if inclusionary or non-rigorous signal to ethnic groups that they are welcome or
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that the state has made citizenship laws inclusive because they approve citizenship obtainment
from all ethnic groups, which translates that they are tolerated because they are welcome.
Language recognition transcribes into cultural tolerance because language is a core part of an
ethnic groups culture and identity, once their language is deemed as recognized and free to be
used this highlights tolerance-the results produce some contrary findings however that can be
argued to correlate with ethnofederalism.
After running the regressions with appropriate control variables (lights inequality, elevation
mean, capital distance mean, group size, log of country population count, log of per capita GDP,
economic inequality, petroleum distance, and peace years) the findings are varied. Language
recognition although significant, seemed to have an opposite effect on ethnic conflict onset. This
can best be explained through the negative effects of ethnofederalism and language recognition
exacerbating the need for autonomy. There are implications to consider from the language
recognition variable. Perhaps states should focus more on integral methods of incorporating
minority ethnic groups into society including language policies versus the ethnofederalist
approach of granting sovereignty and separate language policies. The conflict between Russia
and the Chechens illustrates a case where language recognition along with other ethnofederal
strides lead to a greater demand for sovereignty and a concrete opposition to integration. While
on the contrary language recognition in Kazakhstan seemed to have a positive effect on ethnic
conflict prevention with the Russians as well as other ethnic groups. Citizenship laws showed to
have a positive effect on ethnic conflict, highlighting that more inclusionary and less difficult
citizenship policies lead to less ethnic conflict. Moldova having some of the most difficult
citizenship laws posits a scenario that could have instigated the Transnistrian war by adding to
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the nationalist uprisings and ethnic tensions, while Kazakhstan has inclusive and easy citizenship
laws with no recorded ethnic conflict. Implications from the citizenship variable suggest that
states should incorporate more open citizenship laws in order to help prevent ethnic conflict.
There is a contrast in the findings where recognizing a language leads to conflict, but restrictive
citizenship laws also increase conflict as they force people to learn another language. Perhaps,
language is a variable that has varying effects depending on the circumstances.
Policy makers should consider the negative correlation between language recognition and
ethnic conflict as a further implication that ethnofederalism does not prevent ethnic conflict, but
instead may exacerbate it. In this case policies should be structured towards integrating minority
ethnic groups as part of the state instead of creating a separate state or land for them to govern
with its own language. The positive effect that inclusionary citizenship laws have on ethnic
conflict should be taken into account as well. Policy makers can advocate for less rigorous and
exclusionary citizenship laws in order to deter ethnic conflict. Researchers can interpret the
language recognition results as yet another study that confirms the negative effect
ethnofederalism may have on ethnic conflict occurrence. The generalizability of the results is fair
in that the Soviet Union provides enough variation in different countries and ethnic groups,
however not enough variation for the constitutional protection variable to be assessed, which is
one of the limitations of this research. Prospects for future research include using a greater
sample size, not only post-Soviet states but states from all over the world to add even more
generalizability. Perhaps then, constitutional protection will have variance and can be properly
tested. Also, the use of state-minority group dyads might be a positive externality for reducing
conflict in general, which can also be addressed in future research. Another limitation is the lack
40

of states with minority-reserved seats in government. Similarly, a greater sample size of
countries from around the globe will provide more states that have minority reserved parliament
seats, allowing for a more sufficient test on the plausible significance of this variable.
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